Prince, Panda, and H-Pay: What Three Linked Failures Reveal About Banking Risk in Cambodia

Cambodia’s banking regulator has now put two licensed commercial banks and a licensed payment provider into liquidation inside seven months. That is an unusual density of failures for a banking system with roughly fifty institutions, and it is tempting to read it as three unrelated stories — a crime case, a balance-sheet problem, and a payments dispute. They are not unrelated. Prince Bank, Panda Bank, and H-Pay (formerly Huione Pay) trace back to the same corporate network, and together they are the clearest real-world test yet of what happens to a depositor, a creditor, or a transaction-in-progress when a Cambodian financial institution fails. For anyone holding money in the country — including buyers wiring a deposit, running an escrow, or banking proceeds from a sale — the mechanics matter more than the headlines.

What actually happened, in order

Prince Bank — January 2026. The National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) placed Prince Bank Plc into liquidation after Chen Zhi, chairman of parent conglomerate Prince Group, was arrested in a joint Cambodian-Chinese operation on January 6 and extradited to China to face prosecution [S-819]. Prince Group — encompassing Prince Bank and 146 other entities — had already been sanctioned by the United States and United Kingdom in October 2025, with both governments describing the group as a transnational criminal organisation running online scam operations built on forced labour, targeting victims in the US and elsewhere [S-819]. Prince Bank was a real institution by Cambodian standards: close to $1 billion in assets across 36 branches, roughly $780 million in deposits from ordinary customers plus another $400 million linked to related parties within the wider group, and a loan book of about $760 million that has since been transferred in full to state-owned Cambodia Post Bank to keep borrowers’ accounts running [S-825].

Panda Bank — February 23, 2026. The NBC revoked Panda Commercial Bank’s licence, citing prudential supervision findings that its financial condition had deteriorated to the point it could no longer provide banking services [S-821]. Panda was smaller — about $776 million in total assets, $536 million in loans, $502 million in deposits, and 0.77 percent of the banking system by end-2025 [S-821] — but the official “deteriorating finances” framing understates the connection to the Prince case. Panda shared senior leadership and directors with both Prince Bank and Huione Pay, the sanctioned payment platform tied to billions of dollars in cryptocurrency scam-laundering; Panda’s own CEO had previously served as Prince Bank’s chief operating officer [S-820]. Its attraction to depositors — interest rates up to roughly 10 percent, among the highest advertised in the country — is, in hindsight, exactly the kind of above-market yield that should prompt scrutiny rather than comfort [S-820].

H-Pay / Huione Pay — ongoing since 2025. The NBC revoked the licence of payment provider H-Pay Services (formerly Huione Pay) for non-compliance with banking-sector regulations; the firm entered liquidation, rebranded, and had its licence revoked a second time in March 2026 [S-822]. Around 1,300 people registered as creditors, and by late April 2026 dozens gathered outside the central bank to demand their frozen funds back, with protests turning tense [S-823]. Here the NBC’s position has been notably different from its handling of Prince and Panda: once it deemed Huione Pay’s liquidation “completed,” the central bank told creditors the matter was beyond its jurisdiction and that individual claims must go through the courts [S-822].

The through-line, not three coincidences

Read separately, this looks like a crime story, a solvency story, and a payments-dispute story. Read together, it is one story: a single network — built around Prince Group and the Huione ecosystem — had reach into a licensed commercial bank, into a second bank through shared personnel, and into a licensed payment platform, all operating under NBC licences before the network was unwound. The relevant due-diligence question isn’t “is Cambodian banking in crisis” — Cambodia’s largest banks (ABA, ACLEDA, Canadia and the rest) are untouched by any of this, and Panda alone represented well under one percent of system assets. The relevant question is narrower and more useful: licensing and supervision did not prevent this network from operating inside the regulated financial system for years before enforcement caught up. That is a real, specific supervisory gap — not a reason to distrust every Cambodian bank, but a reason not to treat an NBC licence, on its own, as a full character reference for who is behind an institution.

Two very different experiences of “recourse”

The most practically important distinction in this whole episode is between what happened to Prince and Panda depositors versus what happened to H-Pay creditors, because it shows two entirely different regimes operating under the same regulator.

Licensed deposit-taking banks got an orderly, supervised liquidation. For Prince Bank, nearly all depositors have been repaid, with only court-frozen accounts and a small number of uncontactable customers still outstanding [S-818]. For Panda, roughly 96 percent of depositors are expected to receive full reimbursement in the first payout phase, with small-balance holders ($1–$500) given a one-month window to claim and 188 larger depositors slated for later phases tied to how quickly the bank’s assets convert to cash [S-818]. A single court-appointed liquidator, Morisonkak MKA Audit-Accounting, has run both processes under continued NBC supervision, publishing phased timelines and running a dedicated hotline [S-818]. It is not instant, and it is not costless — but it is a functioning process with a name, a timeline, and a regulator standing behind it.

A revoked payment licence got something much thinner. H-Pay creditors have no equivalent phased-repayment mechanism on offer. Once the NBC judged the liquidation “completed,” it told the roughly 1,300 registered creditors that their claims sit outside its jurisdiction and must be pursued individually through the courts [S-822] — a route that is slower, costlier, and far less certain than a bank liquidator’s schedule, and one that pushed frustrated creditors into the street [S-823]. The practical lesson: the type of licence your money sits behind determines what happens if the institution fails. A deposit-taking commercial bank in liquidation gets a structured, NBC-supervised wind-down. A payment or e-money provider — however bank-like its app and marketing look — may not.

The gap underneath both stories: no deposit insurance

Neither case has unfolded against a backstop most foreign buyers would assume exists. Cambodia is one of the only members of ASEAN+3 without a deposit insurance scheme of any kind [S-824]. The NBC and Ministry of Economy and Finance have a working group studying a proposed “Deposit Protection and Bank Resolution Unit” that would sit inside the central bank, fund itself through premiums paid by participating institutions, and start with deliberately low coverage ceilings to limit the burden on banks [S-824] — but this is a feasibility study, not a law, and no timeline for enactment has been set. The stakes are not abstract: broad money has grown from 41.6 percent of GDP in 2010 to over 142 percent by 2022, one of the highest ratios in ASEAN, and roughly 90 percent of deposits are held in US dollars — which structurally limits the NBC’s ability to act as lender of last resort in the way a central bank with a dominant domestic currency can [S-824]. Digital banking has also compressed how fast a bank run can unfold, from the 16–19 days seen in 2008-era crises to under two days in a digital-rail environment [S-824]. Put simply: Cambodia’s financial system has grown faster than its safety net, and until the proposed unit becomes real and funded, every depositor is relying on the case-by-case competence of a court-appointed liquidator rather than a guaranteed payout.

This is not a new discovery for readers of this site — our bank-comparison guide has flagged limited deposit protection as a reason to favour the largest, best-capitalised institutions. Prince, Panda, and H-Pay are the concrete case that proves the caution was not theoretical.

What this means if you are transacting property or holding funds here

• Concentration risk is the practical enemy. Don’t hold a large deposit, escrow balance, or sale proceeds entirely in one institution, particularly a smaller or newer one, however good its app or however attractive its rates. Panda’s ~10 percent interest offer is the textbook example of a yield that should have raised questions, not confidence [S-820].
• Know what kind of licence you’re actually dealing with. A commercial bank licensed for deposit-taking gets NBC-supervised liquidation with a phased repayment process if it fails. A payment platform or e-money provider — even one that looks and behaves like a bank — may not, as H-Pay creditors have learned the hard way [S-822]. Ask directly, in writing, which licence category the institution holds.
• A licence is a floor, not a guarantee of ownership integrity. Prince Bank and Panda Bank were both properly licensed by the NBC. Licensing did not stop the network behind them from operating for years. Pair “is it licensed” with ordinary questions about beneficial ownership and reputation, especially for newer or fast-growing institutions.
• Escrow and large transfers deserve extra scrutiny of the counterparty bank, not just the developer or seller. If your lawyer or agent proposes routing funds through an unfamiliar bank because a developer “has a relationship” there, that is a prompt to check the bank’s standing independently, not a reason to skip the check.
• Don’t wait for deposit insurance that doesn’t exist yet. Treat the current absence of a scheme as a durable fact for the medium term, not a gap about to close — the same discipline we recommend for FATF/AML compliance and general due diligence applies here: verify rather than assume.

The takeaway

Two commercial banks and a payment provider have failed in Cambodia since January 2026, and they are not three coincidences — they trace back to one sanctioned network that had reach into the licensed financial system before enforcement caught up. Prince and Panda depositors are getting an orderly, NBC-supervised liquidation with real repayment timelines; H-Pay creditors are being told to go to court instead, a sharp reminder that licence type determines recourse. Underneath both outcomes sits a system-wide fact worth holding onto: Cambodia still has no deposit insurance scheme, and the one being studied remains a feasibility exercise, not a protection you can currently rely on. None of this is a reason to avoid Cambodian banks — the largest, systemically important institutions are unaffected and remain the sensible default — but it is a concrete, current reason to choose them deliberately, spread large balances, and verify the licence and ownership behind any institution before trusting it with a transaction.

Sources

• [S-818] Khmer Times — Liquidation of Prince and Panda banks advances under NBC supervision — repayment status; Cambodia Post Bank transfer of Prince Bank customers; Panda’s 96% first-phase reimbursement; $1–$500 small-depositor claim window; 188 large depositors in later phases; H-Pay unresolved.
• [S-819] Khmer Times — Cambodia deports Prince Group boss, puts bank into liquidation — Chen Zhi arrest Jan 6, 2026 and extradition to China; Prince Bank liquidation; US/UK sanctions on Prince Group as transnational criminal organisation (Oct 2025).
• [S-820] CamboJA News — National Bank Revokes Panda Bank License, Orders Liquidation — shared leadership between Panda Bank, Prince Bank, and Huione Pay; Panda’s CEO as former Prince Bank COO; ~10% advertised interest rates.
• [S-821] Khmer Times — Cambodia shuts Panda Commercial Bank over deteriorating finances — Feb 23, 2026 licence revocation; official “deteriorating financial condition” reasoning; $776M assets, $536M loans, $502M deposits, 0.77% of system.
• [S-822] Khmer Times — Huione Pay case beyond NBC jurisdiction, Serey says — NBC position that completed H-Pay/Huione Pay liquidation is outside its jurisdiction; creditors directed to courts.
• [S-823] Cambodianess — Locked Out of Their Savings, Huione Pay Customers Demand Answers as Protest Turns Violent — ~1,300 registered creditors; April 2026 protest outside the central bank.
• [S-824] AMRO — Time is Ripe for a Deposit Protection Scheme in Cambodia — Cambodia’s absence of deposit insurance among ASEAN+3; proposed NBC Deposit Protection and Bank Resolution Unit; broad money 41.6%→142.1% of GDP (2010–2022); ~90% USD deposits; digital bank-run speed comparison.
• [S-825] Cambodia Investment Review — Prince Bank’s Estimated US$760 Million Loan Book Fully Transferred to Cambodia Post Bank Following 2025 Closure — Prince Bank’s ~$1B assets, 36 branches, ~$780M ordinary deposits plus ~$400M related-party deposits, $760M loan book transfer.